This paper is motivated by the idea that self-control is more difficult to exert the more it is exerted. We extend the theory of temptation and self-control introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer [8] to allow for an increasing marginal cost of resisting temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. We also prove a general representation theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost functions. Both models maintain Gul and Pesendorfer's Order, Continuity and Set-Betweenness axioms but violate Independence.
Introduction
Gul and Pesendorfer [8] (henceforth GP) introduce a theory of choice under temptation. They model an agent who experiences temptation at the moment of choice, and anticipates this in an ex-ante period where he selects what choice problem to face. In this ex-ante period he has a particular perspective on what he should choose, embodied in a 'normative preference'. He understands that his choice from menus will not necessarily respect normative preference, but rather will seek to balance his normative preference with the cost of resisting temptation.
GP axiomatize the following model (1)- (2) . Denote the space of alternatives (lotteries) by ∆ and the space of menus (nonempty subsets of ∆) by Z. The primitive is a preference over menus Z, and reflects the ex-ante choice between menus prior to ex-post (unmodelled) choice from a menu. The general class of models that captures an abstract version of the story in GP is reflected in the following representation for :
where u : ∆ → R represents a vNM normative preference and c(µ, x) reflects the self-control cost of choosing µ from the menu x. The representation suggests that the utility of a menu is its indirect utility: the maximum of normative utility less self-control costs. GP's model is a specialization that tells a very specific story about the self-control cost function c. Their model identifies a vNM function v : ∆ → R that represents the temptation perspective, and measures self-control costs c in terms of the difference between the maximum temptation utility achievable in a menu x and the actual temptation utility achieved by a choice µ ∈ x:
That is, the self-control cost of choosing µ from x is identified with the corresponding degree of 'frustration' of the temptation perspective. A peculiar feature of GP's cost function is its linearity in the degree to which temptation preferences are frustrated, that is, in max η∈x v(η) − v(µ). Intuitively, the agent has a constant marginal cost of exerting self-control. This paper is based on the idea that the marginal cost may not be constant. Introspection suggests that the exertion of self-control involves an uphill battle: the marginal cost appears to increase with the exertion of selfcontrol. This is supported by research in psychology that demonstrates that self-control is a limited resource.
1 Motivated by the idea of uphill self-control, this paper axiomatizes two models.
General Self-Control Representation: The first model takes the form
where u and v are linear and c satisfies some minimal regularity properties that support its interpretation as the cost of self-control. This expunges from GP's model all but the basic linearity required for the existence of linear normative and temptation utilities, without departing from the basic qualitative story underlying GP's model. Thus, the agent maximizes normative utility net of self-control costs, and the cost c(µ, ·) is increasing for any given possible choice µ.
Convex Self-Control Representation:
The second model is a nonlinear extension of GP's model given by
for some increasing function ϕ : R + → R + that is convex on the part of the domain that 'matters for behavior'. This model enriches the general model by requiring self-control costs to depend on the degree of frustration of temptation preference, as in the GP model, but without forcing this dependence to be linear. The convex self-control model behaviorally differs from the GP model in significant ways. As expressed by one of our axioms, a peculiar feature of convex self-control is that randomization never makes it harder to exert self-control. For instance, if an agent can choose a risky lottery r despite being tempted by a safe lottery s, then he can also choose the risky lottery when both are mixed with a common third lottery, that is, he can choose αr + (1 − α)ν over αs + (1 − α)ν even if the latter is tempting. Intuitively, randomization reduces the difference in temptation utility between the alternatives which in turn reduces the marginal cost of exerting self-control, thereby enhancing self-control. Notably, this feature generates the Allais paradox: an agent who may choose s over r may also choose αr + (1 − α)ν over αs + (1 − α)ν. Overlapping with our companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [14] ) is also the behavioral implication that convex self-control costs will typically cause ex-post choice to violate the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: an agent may resist temptation and choose αr + (1 − α)ν over αs + (1 − α)ν in a direct comparison, but when the more tempting option s is available, the increased marginal cost of self-control may make αs + (1 − α)ν an attractive compromise.
Further motivation for studying the foundations of the convex self-control can be derived from Fudenberg and Levine [6, 7] . These authors study a (non-axiomatic) dual-self model that features convex self-control costs. While independently making some of the above observations, they also show that their model can explain a wide range of behavioral anomalies, such the Allais paradox, Rabin's paradox, intertemporal preference reversals, the relationship between time and risk preferences observed in experiments, and the relationship between cognitive load and risk preferences. They also show that plausible parameter values allow them to quantitatively fit their model to data on a range of behaviors.
To offer some additional perspective on our paper, we point out where it stands relative to the current development of the axiomatic literature on temptation. GP's axiomatization of their model makes use of four axioms: Order, Continuity, Independence and Set-Betweenness. The first three are natural extensions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms to a sets of lotteries setting, and the fourth expresses the agent's temptation and anticipated choice from menus. Of the four axioms, Set-Betweenness is clearly a substantive axiom for a model of decision under temptation. Indeed, existing generalizations of GP's model (Chatterjee and Krishna [3] , Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [4] , Stoval [17] ) have focused on relaxing Set-Betweenness while maintaining Independence. This paper (and the companion paper [14] ) seeks to understand what is potentially lost if one maintains Independence, a convenient and standard axiom in the literature that seems less important than Set-Betweenness from the point of view of decision under temptation. We show that the axiom is not auxiliary in nature in that it rules out intuitive qualitative stories about decision under temptation, even if Set-Betweenness is retained. In fact, both the models axiomatized in this paper satisfy Set-Betweenness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. This Introduction concludes with a mention of related literature. Sections 2 and 3 axiomatize our general and convex models respectively. Section 4 concludes with some observations of the convex model's implied properties for ex post choice. All proofs are contained in appendices.
Related Literature
In a game-theoretic setting, Fudenberg and Levine [6, 7] study the interaction of a long-run patient self and a sequence of short-run impulsive selves, each of which is a primitive of their model. They show that the equilibria of the game played by those selves can be regarded as the solution to a maximization problem analogous to (1) . Their general setup allows for cases where the cost function might be convex, which would then correspond to specializations of (1) which include the convex self-control model. In [7] they construct and analyze a model with convex self-control costs that explains and quantitatively fits a range of experimental findings.
In the temptation literature, Chatterjee and Krishna [3] , Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [4] and Stoval [17] generalize GP's model. They model agents who are uncertain about temptation (e.g. uncertain about the temptation preference itself, or uncertainty regarding the strength of self-control, etc.), and Dekel et al also axiomatize a model where multiple temptations are experienced by the agent. These models relax Set-Betweenness but maintain Independence. This paper explores an alternative direction where Set-Betweenness is maintained and Independence relaxed. We interpret violations of Independence in terms of non-linear self-control costs. In a companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [14] ), we focus on another possible source of violations of Independence, specifically the possibility of menu-dependent self-control.
Nehring [12] is interested in a more careful description of the notion of self-control, which he interprets in terms of a preference over preferences (second order preferences). Olszewski [15] relaxes the single-dimensionality of temptation in GP's model by permitting different alternatives in a menu to be tempted by different alternatives in the menu. Though not specifically motivated by the idea of uphill self-control, these authors provide foundations for functional forms that can accommodate uphill self-control. On a technical level these papers differ substantially from ours in that they focus on discrete settings whereas we provide an axiomatic generalization of GP's model in a sets-of-lotteries setting.
Finally, we mention Gul and Pesendorfer [10] who, also in a discrete setting, axiomatize a general model. Their representation for preference over menus is of the form
which admits the interpretation that the agent is tempted to maximize some temptation utility v but choice is determined by the maximization of some function w. The two utilities are then aggregated by the function f . To compare, we note that our general model corresponds to the form
Thus, while ex post choice in the Gul and Pesendorfer [10] model maximizes a utility w, in our model ex post choice from x maximizes the menu-dependent utility f (µ, max η∈x v(η)). Indeed, ex post choice in their model satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and this in turn suggests that the model is not suitably interpreted as one involving non-linear self-control.
General Model
For any compact metric space C, ∆(C) denotes the set of all probability measures on the Borel σ-algebra of C, endowed with the weak convergence topology; ∆(C) is compact and metrizable [1, Thm 14.11], and we often write it simply as ∆. Let Z = K(∆) denote the set of all nonempty compact subsets of ∆. When endowed with the Hausdorff topology, Z is a compact metric space [1, Thm 3.71(3) ]. An element x ∈ Z is referred to as a menu. Generic elements of Z are x, y, z whereas generic elements of ∆ are µ, η, ν.
Similarly, xαy ≡ {µαη : µ ∈ x, η ∈ y} ∈ Z is an α-mixture of menus x and y.
As in GP, the primitive is a preference over Z.
Axioms
The first three axioms are familiar from GP.
Axiom 1 (Order)
is complete and transitive. We refer the reader to GP for a more complete discussion of Set-Betweenness, which involves interpreting the ranking of x and x ∪ y as indicating whether there temptation lies in y, and the ranking of x ∪ y and y as indicating whether (unmodelled) ex post choice from the menu x ∪ y lies in y. What needs to be noted for the purpose of this paper is that the interpretation of Set-Betweenness does not hinge on any precise properties of how exertion of self-control in the menu x ∪ y affects its desirability. This suggests that Set-Betweenness is not inconsistent with generalizations of GP that relax the structure on self-control costs.
GP's fourth axiom formulates the standard vNM independence axiom to the menussetting: for all x, y, z and α ∈ (0, 1),
We relax Independence so as to impose vNM structure on commitment preference and temptation preference only. Commitment Independence is readily interpreted. The first part of Temptation Independence states that η tempts (resp. does not tempt) µ if and only if ηαν tempts (resp. does not tempt) µαν. The second part states that if η and η both tempt (resp. do not tempt) µ, then the mixture ηαη tempts (resp. does not tempt) µ. These are properties that would be expected from a vNM temptation preference.
To introduce the next axiom, consider some rankings of menus that are presumably associated with temptation preference. Say that η is at least as tempting as µ if either {µ} {µ, η} or {η} ∼ {µ, η} {µ} holds. As in the previous axiom, the first condition is a typical behavior revealing that η is more tempting than µ. The second condition says that η is normatively superior to µ, and the agent does not exhibit preference for commitment to η. This preference pattern reveals that µ is not more tempting than η, in other words, η is at least as tempting as µ.
The key axiom we adopt for our general model is: The axiom simply says that if we replace η with something less tempting, then the agent is not worse-off. Intuitively, the lower the temptation in a menu, the lower the self-control costs associated with resisting temptation. However, the axiom covers also the following possibility: if ν is less tempting than η and also normatively superior, then ex-post the agent may optimally choose to submit to temptation, rather than incur any self-control cost. However, even in this case, the agent would be better off with {µ, ν} than {µ, η}, as he would submit to temptation in {µ, ν} only because the normative cost of doing so would be smaller than the self-control cost of resisting, which itself is smaller than the self-control cost incurred in {µ, η}.
Representation Theorem
The most general representation result in this paper is: 
where u, v : ∆ → R + are continuous linear functions and c : ∆×v(∆) → R + is a continuous function that is weakly increasing in its second argument, and satisfies:
A preference that satisfies the noted axiom is referred to as a temptation-dependent self-control preference, and the representation is a temptation-dependent self-control representation. The function c possesses minimal properties required to interpret it as a self-control cost function. Monotonicity in its second argument reflects the fact that choosing any given alternative µ is more costly from menus with greater temptation. Condition (i) says that the self-control cost of submitting to temptation is zero. Condition (ii) says that the self-control cost of resisting temptation is strictly positive.
The model accommodates cost functions which embody the idea that any deviation from the most tempting alternative is costly:
However, the model's uniqueness properties are such that this is not ensured by the axioms for all µ, l. If (µ, l) is such that v(µ) < l and there is no η with v(η) = l such that {µ} {µ, η} {η}, then c(µ, l) is unrestricted. The intuition is that alternatives that are always dominated in both normative and temptation terms are never chosen. Note that the only way that unchosen alternatives 'affect' the ex-ante preference is if they are most tempting, and in particular, unchosen alternatives that are never most tempt have no impact on . Preferences over menus are not rich enough data in order to recover the cost of choosing such unchosen alternatives, and consequently any cost can be assigned to them -this is reflected formally in the following theorem. This lack of uniqueness is a minimal detraction, if at all: alternatives that are never most tempting nor ever chosen are also not of interest either from a descriptive standpoint or a normative one.
Theorem 2 Suppose that (u, v, c) and (u , v , c ) are both representations of a nondegenerate temptation-dependent self-control preference. Then there exist constants
) on the set:
The straightforward proof is omitted.
Convex Model
In this section we present a specialization of our general model that reflects two things: First, the cost of self-control depends on the difference between temptation utility from choice and maximum temptation utility possible. Second, the cost of self-control is convex, thereby capturing the idea of uphill self-control. We first formally describe the functional form and then present its axiomatization.
Functional Form
As in the general model, let u be a normative utility function and v be a temptation utility function over lotteries. Both functions are continuous and mixture linear. If µ is chosen with self-control in {µ, η}, we refer to the difference w = v(η) − v(µ) as the magnitude of temptation frustration, or frustration for short. We now describe a functional form where the cost of self-control is a convex transformation of w. This requires us to define the maximum benefit from self-control among binary menus where the frustration is equal to w: for all w > 0, let
states that µ is normatively preferred to η, yet η is more tempting.
2 Since u(µ) − u(η) is the benefit from self-control, F (w) is the maximum benefit from self-control among binary menus {µ, η} where frustration, v(η) − v(µ), equals w. Identify any convex self-control representation (4) with the corresponding tuple (u, v, ϕ) . This model describes an agent for whom the costs of self-control increase at an increasing rate as more self-control is exerted. This is unlike the GP model, where the marginal cost of exerting self-control is constant. The restriction on ϕ says simply that the agent does not exercise self-control when frustration exceeds a threshold level w. Since F defines an upper bound on the benefit of self-control, it is the case that whenever η tempts µ and v(η) − v(µ) = w > w, the normative benefit u(µ) − u(η) of self-control is always less than the self-control cost ϕ(w):
Definition 1 A preference is a convex self-control preference if there exists a representation W : Z → R for defined by:
Hence self-control is never exerted outside the interval [0, w]. Indeed, the condition ensures that self-control costs are convex where it is meaningful.
Axioms
We augment the general model with three axioms. Each are implied by Independence and are therefore weaker.
Axiom 7 (Weak Binary Independence)
For all µ, µ , η, η , ν, ν ∈ ∆ and all α ∈ (0, 1),
This is a weakening of an axiom introduced by Ergin and Sarver [5] , who impose the axiom on all menus rather than just binary menus. Note that Independence implies that for all µ, µ , η, η , ν, ν ∈ ∆ and all α, β ∈ (0, 1),
Weak Binary Independence is the implication of Independence in which the mixing coefficients α, β are equal. The axiom states that the ranking of binary menus {µ, µ } and {η, η } when mixed with a common singleton {ν} is independent of the lottery in the singleton. Intuitively, this reflects a 'translation invariance' property that states that if a common 'translation' is applied to the elements of both the menus {µ, µ } and {η, η }, then the ranking of the menus is unaffected. 3 This behavior arises when self-control cost is measured in terms of the deviation from the most tempting alternative.
Axiom 8 (Mixing Preserves Self-Control (MPSC))
For all µ, η and α ∈ (0, 1), {µ} {µ, η} {η} =⇒ {µ} {µ, ηαµ} {ηαµ}.
MPSC says that, if the agent exhibits self-control at {µ, η}, then he does so at {µ, ηαµ}. Notice that the temptation frustration between µ and ηαµ is smaller than that between µ and η, as the first pair of alternatives are 'closer' to each other. Since we are modelling an agent whose self-control ability is greater for small deviations from the tempting alternative, it follows that self-control must be preserved as stated in the axiom.
While the previous axiom describes an implication of uphill self-control on anticipated choice from menus, the next axiom is a direct expression of uphill self-control in the ranking of menus. For any menu x, define its singleton equivalent e x ∈ ∆ by {e x } ∼ x. Under Order, Continuity and Commitment Independence, every menu has a singleton equivalent. Observe that, due to the vNM structure imposed on underlying temptation preference, the temptation frustration in the mixed menu {µαµ , ηαη } is an average of the temptation frustration in each of the two menus. Thus, the evaluation of {µαµ , ηαη } contains the self-control cost associated with this average frustration. On the other hand, due to the linearity of commitment preference, the mixture {e {µ,η} αe {µ ,η } } of singleton equivalents embodies an average of the self-control costs at the two levels of temptation frustration. Convexity of self-control costs implies that the self-control cost of the average must be lower than the average of the self-control costs. The axiom reflects precisely this.
Representation Theorem
Say that on Z is a self-control preference if there exist µ, µ ∈ ∆ with {µ} {µ, µ } {µ }. The main result of this section is:
Theorem 3 A self-control preference satisfies all the axioms of Theorem 1, Weak Binary Independence, MPSC, and Self-Control Concavity if and only if is a convex self-control preference.
This establishes the behavioral foundations of the convex self-control model. A discussion of the proof of the result is deferred to the next subsection.
Observe that the convex self-control representation requires ϕ to be convex only on an interval [0, w]. Our axioms do not guarantee that a convex extension to R + exists. The issue is technical: in order for the extension to exist it is necessary that ϕ be Lipschitz continuous on [0, w] . It is possible to describe restrictions on preference that guarantee this, but we omit them because of their lack of transparency.
As a corollary of the theorem, we obtain the GP model when Self-Control Concavity is strengthened to a Self-Control Linearity condition: Thus, we see that it is Self-Control Linearity that forces the linear self-control costs property in GP's model. This alternative axiomatization of GP's model provides perspective on the behavioral foundations of their model by highlighting the various implications of Independence in the presence of Order, Continuity and Set-Betweenness. Indeed, this permits a more transparent evaluation of that axiom and, in turn, of the model. Now turn to the uniqueness properties of the convex self-control representation. Given a representation (u, v, ϕ) , the self-control subdomain is defined as follows:
for some µ, η s.t. {µ} {µ, η} {η}}.
∈ R, self-control is never exerted at {µ, η}. Thus, the actual shape of ϕ outside R is immaterial in the description of choice behavior. Note that since preference satisfies the MPSC axiom, R is an interval with inf R = 0. Notice also that the threshold level w associated with the representation must satisfies
The uniqueness properties of the representation mirror those of the general representation. The theorem states that u and v are unique up to positive affine transformation. When ϕ,φ are differentiable, the stated condition on ϕ andφ implies that forw = α v w and w ∈ R,wφ (w) ϕ (w) = wϕ (w) ϕ (w) where f and f denote the first and the second derivatives of f , respectively. Thus the curvature of ϕ is uniquely determined within the self-control subdomain.
Proof Outline for Theorem 3
The main technical difficulty is not establishing convexity, but rather showing that the self-control cost function in the general model takes the form
We explain next how the function ϕ is derived from preference.
The functions u, v, and W are determined as in the general model. Take any µ, η satisfying {µ} {µ, η} {η}. This ranking suggests that µ is chosen with self-control in {µ, η}. Hence, the difference u(µ)−W ({µ, η}) should exactly express the cost of self-control at {µ, η}. On the other hand, the temptation frustration is
The key step in the proof is to show that ϕ is indeed well-defined. This is demonstrated by establishing that for all µ, µ , η, η such that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and {µ } {µ , η } {η },
The bulk of the proof for this claim concerns the case where µ, µ , η, η have finite supports and belong to the interior of ∆ µ,µ ,η,η , the finite-dimensional set of lotteries over the union of the supports. The result for general lotteries then obtains by a continuity argument together with the fact that the set of lotteries with finite supports is dense in ∆ under the weak convergence topology. So take such lotteries µ, µ , η, η that satisfy the hypothesis of (6). An implication of MPSC and Self-Control Concavity is that for any α ∈ [0, 1],
That is, since η tempts µ and η tempts µ , it is also true that the mixture ηαη tempts the mixture µαµ . We observe that there is an open neighborhood
That is, small movements from α respect the implication (6) . 5 This observation makes use of Weak Binary Independence and in particular Temptation Dependence. But now observe that {O(α)} α∈ [0, 1] is an open cover of [0, 1]. Therefore there exists a finite subcover, and indeed, we can find a finite number of mixing coefficients 1 = α
Thus, via this 'chain' linking u(µ) − W ({µ, η}) and u(µ ) − W ({µ , η }) we are able to prove (6) . An immediate implication of (6) is that
It then follows that ϕ as defined in (5) is indeed well-defined (in fact it also follows that it is increasing).
Concluding Remarks: Ex post Choice
While the convex self-control model is a representation for an ex ante preference over menus, it suggests that ex post choice is given by the choice correspondence defined by:
We conclude this paper with some observations about this choice correspondence in the context of choice under risk. An immediate observation is that C ϕ is menu-dependent via its dependence on the most tempting alternative in the menu. If ϕ is convex, for instance, this would imply that while an agent can pick a 'good' alternative over a moderately tempting alternative, adding an even more tempting alternative to the menu may induce the agent to choose the moderately tempting alternative, thereby violating the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. The intuition for such choice is that the loss of self-control ability due to the presence of a great temptation may make the agent unable to choose the 'good' alternative, but he may nevertheless have enough self-control to resist the great temptation. He chooses the moderately tempting alternative as a compromise. An analysis of the notion of menudependent self-control can be found in a companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [14] ).
The choice structure as given by (7) has an interesting implication for choice under risk: choice between risky prospects may not be explicable by expected utility theory. In fact, the model may accommodate the common ratio effect (Allais [2] , Kahneman and Tversky [11] ). To illustrate, consider an agent who normatively prefers a risky lottery r to a riskless one s but is tempted by the latter. Moreover, suppose he exhibits {r} {r, s} ∼ {s}, and {rαs} {rαs, s} {s} for some α ∈ (0, 1).
The former ranking suggests that the agent yields to temptation at {r, s} and ends up with choosing tempting option s, while the latter ranking says that he exercises self-control at {rαs, s} and chooses rαs over s, that is, mixing r with s induces self-control. Since {rαs, s} is obtained by mixing {r, s} and {s} with proportion α, this preference reversal has the spirit of the common ratio effect. In the convex self-control model, this choice pattern is rationalized if both
u(s) ≥ u(r) − ϕ(v(s) − v(r)), and u(rαs) − ϕ(v(s) − v(rαs)) > u(s)
hold. That is,
(α(v(s) − v(r))).
These inequalities can hold when ϕ is convex.
Observe that the utility function in (7) is concave in µ when ϕ is convex. This feature distinguishes choice behavior of this model from that of other non-expected utility models satisfying monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Given the fact that s is preferred to r, the monotonicity condition requires that s should be preferred to any mixed options rαs, whereas some rαs may be strictly preferred to both r and s when ϕ is convex. Intuitively, this is because the mixed option rαs is a good compromise for the conflict between normative and temptation utilities. In terms of preference over menus, this property implies that {r, rαs, s} may be strictly preferred to {r, s}.
To conclude, we note that the convex model lends itself to an infinite horizon extension in the spirit of [9, 13] . In this setting, convexity potentially has interesting implications for the interaction of risk and time preferences and also for the timing of resolution of risk.
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of necessity of the axioms is routine. For Temptation Dependence, observe that since v(ν) ≤ v(η) and c(µ, ·) is weakly increasing,
Suffiency of the axioms is established in a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (i) There exists a continuous linear function u : ∆ → R + such that {µ} {η} ⇐⇒ u(µ) ≥ u(η) (ii) There exists a continuous function W : Z → R + that represents and satisfies W ({µ}) = u(µ) for all µ ∈ ∆. (iii) There exists a continuous linear function v : ∆ → R + such that if {µ} {η} then {µ} {µ, η} ⇐⇒ v(η) > v(µ).
Proof. (i) The first assertion follows from Order, Continuity, Commitment Independence, and the mixture space theorem.
(ii) Since u is continuous on ∆, there exist a maximal and a minimal lottery µ ∆ , µ ∆ ∈ ∆ with respect to u. Without loss of generality, we can assume u(µ ∆ ) = 1 and u(µ ∆ ) = 0. From Continuity and Set Betweenness, {µ ∆ } x {µ ∆ } for all x ∈ Z. By a standard argument, for all x ∈ Z, there exists a unique number 
By continuity and linearity of v, it is clear that L(l) is a nonempty compact convex set for each l. Define the self-control cost function by:
The following Lemma clarifies various properties of c. Properties (iii)-(vi) correspond to the properties in the statement of the Theorem.
Lemma 3 (i) For any µ, l, if {µ} {µ, η} {η} for some η with v(η)
= l, then c(µ, l) = u(µ) − W ({µ, η}) > 0. (ii) For any µ, l, if {µ} {µ, η} for some η ∈ L(l), then c(µ, l) > 0. (iii) For any µ, l, if l ≤ v(µ) then c(µ, l) = 0. (iv) If u(µ) > u(η) and l = max µ,η v then v(µ) < v(η) ⇐⇒ c(µ, l) > 0.
(v) For any µ, c(µ, ·) is weakly increasing. (vi) The function c is continuous.

Proof. (i) For any ν ∈ L(l), v(ν) ≤ v(η), and thus by Lemma 2, u(µ)
(ii) Obvious from the definition of c.
(iii) Under the hypothesis, {µ} {µ, η} for all η ∈ L(l). Consequently max ν∈L(l) {u(µ)− W ({µ, ν})} ≤ 0 and so c(µ, l) = 0. (iv) Sufficiency obtains from part (ii). For the converse, note that if v(µ) ≥ v(η) then l = v(µ), and thus part (iii) implies c(µ, l)
∆ is a continuous correspondence. The assertion then follows from the following argument: Since u and W are continuous, the Maximum Theorem implies that (µ, l) → max ν∈L(l) {u(µ) − W ({µ, ν})} is continuous. Moreover, since the upper envelope of two continuous functions is continuous, the function c is continuous.
To show that L is upper hemicontinuous, take any sequence {l n } ⊂ v(∆) that converges to some l ∈ v(∆), and suppose that η n ∈ L(l n ) for each n. We must show that there is a subsequence {l n(m) } s.t. η n(m) → η for some η ∈ L(l). Since {η n } is a sequence in a compact set ∆, it has a convergent subsequence η n(m) → η for some η. Since v(η n(m) ) ≤ l n(m) for each m, and since v is continuous, it follows that v(η) ≤ l, and thus η ∈ L(l), as desired.
To show that L is lower hemicontinuous, take any sequence {l n } ⊂ v(∆) that converges to some l ∈ v(∆), and suppose that η ∈ L(l). We must show that there exists a subsequence 
, and also note that Proof. Consider the various cases. In each case, let l = max {µ,η} v. (iv) {η} {η, µ} {µ}. The argument is analogous to that in cases (i) and (ii).
Lemma 5 For all finite menus
Proof. The argument is similar that used in the conclusion of the proof [8, Thm 1]. Gul and Pesendorfer [8, Lemma 2] show that if satisfies Set Betweenness, for all finite menus
Fix µ ∈ x arbitrarily. Since c(ν, ·) is weakly increasing for all ν,
where η µ is a minimizer of the associated minimization problem. Since the above inequality holds for all µ ∈ x, if follows from (8) that
On the other hand, fix η ∈ x arbitrarily. Since c(ν, ·) is weakly increasing,
where µ η is a minimizer of the associated minimization problem. Since c(ν, ·) is weakly increasing and the above inequality holds for all η ∈ x, if follows from (8) that
Taking (9) and (10) together, the desired result holds.
Lemma 6 For all x ∈ Z, W can be written as the desired form.
Proof. By Lemma 0 of Gul and Pesendorfer [8, p.1421] , there exists a sequence of subsets x n of x such that each x n is finite and x n → x in the Hausdorff metric. By Lemma 5,
Since c is continuous by Lemma 3 (vi), the maximum theorem implies that the RHS of (11) converges to max
On the other hand, by Lemma 1 (ii), W (x n ) → W (x). This completes the proof.
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of necessity of axioms is omitted. The proof of suffiency is as follows. Let (u, v, W ) be the objects guaranteed by Lemma 1. Since u and v are mixture linear,
Since is a self-control preference, A is non-empty.
Lemma 7 (i)
A is an interval with inf A = 0, and (ii) if sup A ∈ A, then sup A = 1.
Proof. (i) It suffices to show that for all
(ii) Since sup A ∈ A, there exist µ, η such that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and
In case of the former, Continuity implies that there exists ν sufficiently close to η such that {µ} {µ, ν} {ν} and
which is a contradiction. The symmetric argument can be applied to the latter case.
Define ϕ :
where µ, η satisfy {µ} {µ, η} {η} and
The lemmas below establish that ϕ is well-defined. Take any finite subset c = {c The preceding lemma yields that Weak Binary Independence is equivalent to the condition that for all µ, µ , η, η ∈ ∆ (N,c) and admissible translations θ ∈ Θ (N,c) for these lotteries,
which is referred to as Translation Invariance.
Lemma 10 For all µ, µ ∈ ∆ (N,c) and
Proof. By Set Betweenness, assume that {µ} {µ, µ } {µ }. Since u is continuous, N,c) . Hence Translation Invariance implies that
Lemma 11 Take all µ, µ , η, η ∈ ∆ with finite supports. Assume that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and {µ } {µ , η } {η }. Then,
Proof. Let c ≡ {c 1 , · · · , c N } ⊂ C be the union of the supports of µ, µ , η, η . Hence, these lotteries belong to ∆ (N,c) .
Step 1 : We claim that if 
Take a lottery ν in the interior of ∆ (N,c) . For all α ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to one, let
Step 2 : We claim that for all β ∈ [0, 1], there exists a relative open interval O(β) containing β such that for allβ ∈ O(β),
Since 
Step 2,
From
Step 3, for all α ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently close to one,
Continuity ensures that
u(µ) − W ({µ, η}) ≥ u(µ ) − W ({µ , η }) as α → 1.
Lemma 12
For all µ, µ , η, η ∈ ∆ such that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and {µ } {µ , η } {η },
Proof. Let µ + and µ − be a maximal and a minimal lottery in ∆ with respect to v. By continuity and mixture linearity of v, for all α sufficiently close to one, v(ηαµ
Since the set of lotteries with finite supports is dense in ∆ under the weak convergence topology (Aliprantis and Border [1, p.513, Theorem 15.10]), there exist sequences {µ n }, {η n }, {µ n }, and {η n } with finite supports such that µ n → µ, η n → ηαµ + , µ n → µ , and η n → η αµ − . Moreover, by continuity of 
Hence, ϕ is well-defined.
(ii) Take w, w ∈ A such that w < w. There exist µ, µ , η, η such that {µ} {µ, η}
(iii) Take any w 0 ∈ A. For any sequence w n → w 0 , n = 1, 2, · · · , we want to show that ϕ(w n ) → ϕ(w 0 ). First suppose w 0 < sup A. Take any w ∈ (w 0 , sup A). There exist µ, η such that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and w = v(η) − v(µ). Since w n → w, w n < w for all sufficiently large n. Define α n ≡ w n w for n = 0 and all sufficiently large n. By MPSC, {µ} {µ, ηα n µ} {ηα n µ} and
Next suppose w 0 = sup A. Since w 0 ∈ A, There exist µ, η such that {µ} {µ, η} {η} and (ii) We show that ϕ is convex on A. Then, by continuity, ϕ is convex on A. Take any w i ∈ (0, w), i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, assume w 1 < w 2 . There exists µ, η 2 ∈ ∆ such that {µ} {µ, η 2 } {η 2 } and w 2 
In the proof of Lemma 1 (ii), we show that for all x ∈ Z, there exists ν ∈ ∆ such that {ν} ∼ x. Let ν i ∈ ∆ satisfy {ν i } ∼ {µ, η i }. By Self-Control Concavity, {µ, η 1 αη 2 } {ν 1 αν 2 }. Thus, we have
(iii) First of all, since ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ(0) < ϕ(w) for all w = 0. Next, take w, w ∈ A such that w > w > 0. There exists α ∈ (0, 1) with w = αw . Since ϕ is convex,
as desired.
Proof. There exist µ , η such that {µ } {µ , η } {η } and
∈ L, and hence
Since
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, sinceᾱ is a supremum of L, there exists a sequence {α n } in L converging toᾱ. We have {µα
that is, W ({µᾱµ , ηᾱη }) > u(ηᾱη ), which contradicts (14) .
Since (ii) By Lemma 13 (iii), ϕ is continuous. Moreover, since F is concave, F is continuous. are sequences in ∆, we can assume µ n → µ 0 and η n → η 0 without loss of generality. Since Finally, we can show that the representation extends to entire domain. The argument is similar that used in the conclusion of the proof [8, Thm 1] . Briefly, by GP [8, Lemma 2], Set-Betweenness implies that the representation extends to all finite menus. Then, given that the set of finite menus is dense in Z in the Hausdorff topology, the continuity of the representation permits the representation to extend to all menus. For a more detailed argument, see Lemmas 5 and 6 in the proof of Theorem 1. 
